NET-IPV6-034 - IPv6 Egress Outbound Spoofing Filter - 'ipv6 verify unicast source reachable-via rx OUTBOUND_TO_BACKBONE'

Warning! Audit Deprecated

This audit has been deprecated and will be removed in a future update.

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Information

The network element must be configured from accepting any outbound IP packet that contains an illegitimate address in the source address field via egress ACL or by enabling Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding in an IPv6 enclave.

Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF) provides a mechanism for IP address spoof protection. When uRPF is enabled on an interface, the router examines all packets received as input on that interface to make sure that the source address and source interface appear in the routing table and match the interface on which the packet was received. If the packet was received from one of the best reverse path routes, the packet is forwarded as normal. If there is no reverse path route on the same interface from which the packet was received, it might mean that the source address was modified. If Unicast RPF does not find a reverse path for the packet, the packet is dropped.

If internal nodes automatically configure an address based on a prefix from a bogus Router Advertisement a dangerous situation may exist. An internal host may contact an internal server which responds with a packet that could be routed outside of the network via default routing (because the routers do not recognize the destination address as an internal address.

To prevent this, filtering should be applied to network interfaces between internal host LANs and internal server LANs to insure that source addresses have valid prefixes.

NOTE: Change 'INTERNAL_INTERFACE' to the router's interface that connects to your LAN.
NOTE: Change 'OUT_TO_BACKBONE_ACL' to the access control list for IPv6 outbound to backbone connection filtering.

Solution

The network element must be configured to ensure that an ACL is configured to restrict the router from accepting any outbound IP packet that contains an external IP address in the source field.

See Also

https://iasecontent.disa.mil/stigs/zip/U_Network_Perimeter_Router_L3_Switch_V8R32_STIG.zip

Item Details

Category: SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION

References: 800-53|SC-7(16), CAT|II, Rule-ID|SV-15427r1_rule, STIG-ID|NET-IPV6-034, Vuln-ID|V-14707

Plugin: Cisco

Control ID: ac322eb4759b9192c9f13cbc86092d0e12d503d09ae050365fbb54ffc0acbfd5