PHP before 5.3.4 accepts the \0 character in a pathname, which might allow context-dependent attackers to bypass intended access restrictions by placing a safe file extension after this character, as demonstrated by .php\0.jpg at the end of the argument to the file_exists function.
https://oval.cisecurity.org/repository/search/definition/oval%3Aorg.mitre.oval%3Adef%3A12569
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/44951
http://www.php.net/releases/5_3_4.php
http://www.php.net/archive/2010.php#id2010-12-10-1
http://www.php.net/ChangeLog-5.php
http://www.mandriva.com/security/advisories?name=MDVSA-2010:254
http://www.madirish.net/?article=436
http://svn.php.net/viewvc?view=revision&revision=305507
http://svn.php.net/viewvc?view=revision&revision=305412
http://support.apple.com/kb/HT4581
http://secunia.com/advisories/55078
http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2014-0311.html
http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2013-1615.html
http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2013-1307.html
http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/12/09/9
http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/12/09/11
http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/12/09/10
http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/11/18/5
http://openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2010/11/18/4
http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=133469208622507&w=2
http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=132871655717248&w=2
http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2015-May/159031.html
http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2015-May/158915.html
http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2015-May/158616.html
http://lists.apple.com/archives/security-announce/2011/Mar/msg00006.html