GRUB2 fails to validate kernel signature when booted directly without shim, allowing secure boot to be bypassed. This only affects systems where the kernel signing certificate has been imported directly into the secure boot database and the GRUB image is booted directly without the use of shim. This issue affects GRUB2 version 2.04 and prior versions.
https://www.suse.com/support/kb/doc/?id=000019673
https://www.suse.com/c/suse-addresses-grub2-secure-boot-issue/
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/07/29/3
https://www.eclypsium.com/2020/07/29/theres-a-hole-in-the-boot/
https://www.debian.org/security/2020-GRUB-UEFI-SecureBoot
https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/KnowledgeBase/GRUB2SecureBootBypass
https://usn.ubuntu.com/4432-1/
https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20200731-0008/
https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202104-05
https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/ADV200011
https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2020-07/msg00034.html
https://access.redhat.com/security/vulnerabilities/grub2bootloader
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/09/21/1
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/09/17/4
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/09/17/2
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/03/02/3
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/07/29/3
http://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-4432-1
http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-08/msg00069.html
http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-08/msg00067.html