A flaw was found in dnsmasq before version 2.83. When getting a reply from a forwarded query, dnsmasq checks in the forward.c:reply_query() if the reply destination address/port is used by the pending forwarded queries. However, it does not use the address/port to retrieve the exact forwarded query, substantially reducing the number of attempts an attacker on the network would have to perform to forge a reply and get it accepted by dnsmasq. This issue contrasts with RFC5452, which specifies a query's attributes that all must be used to match a reply. This flaw allows an attacker to perform a DNS Cache Poisoning attack. If chained with CVE-2020-25685 or CVE-2020-25686, the attack complexity of a successful attack is reduced. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to data integrity.
https://www.tenable.com/cyber-exposure/2021-threat-landscape-retrospective
https://www.tenable.com/blog/dnspooq-seven-vulnerabilities-identified-in-dnsmasq
https://www.jsof-tech.com/disclosures/dnspooq/
https://www.debian.org/security/2021/dsa-4844
https://www.arista.com/en/support/advisories-notices/security-advisories/12135-security-advisory-61
https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202101-17
https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/03/msg00027.html