The npm package "tar" (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.18, 5.0.10, and 6.1.9 has an arbitrary file creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file whose location would be outside of the extraction target directory is not extracted. This is, in part, accomplished by sanitizing absolute paths of entries within the archive, skipping archive entries that contain `..` path portions, and resolving the sanitized paths against the extraction target directory. This logic was insufficient on Windows systems when extracting tar files that contained a path that was not an absolute path, but specified a drive letter different from the extraction target, such as `C:some\path`. If the drive letter does not match the extraction target, for example `D:\extraction\dir`, then the result of `path.resolve(extractionDirectory, entryPath)` would resolve against the current working directory on the `C:` drive, rather than the extraction target directory. Additionally, a `..` portion of the path could occur immediately after the drive letter, such as `C:../foo`, and was not properly sanitized by the logic that checked for `..` within the normalized and split portions of the path. This only affects users of `node-tar` on Windows systems. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.18, 5.0.10 and 6.1.9. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar. There is no reasonable way to work around this issue without performing the same path normalization procedures that node-tar now does. Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched versions of node-tar, rather than attempt to sanitize paths themselves.

The remote SUSE Linux SLES12 host has packages installed that are affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the SUSE-SU-2022:0101-1 advisory.

  - The parser in accepts requests with a space (SP) right after the header name before the colon. This can     lead to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS) in llhttp < v2.1.4 and < v6.0.6. (CVE-2021-22959)

  - The parse function in llhttp < 2.1.4 and < 6.0.6. ignores chunk extensions when parsing the body of     chunked requests. This leads to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS) under certain conditions. (CVE-2021-22960)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.16, 5.0.8, and 6.1.7 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by     ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat     calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
    This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with     the same name as the directory, where the symlink and directory names in the archive entry used     backslashes as a path separator on posix systems. The cache checking logic used both `\` and `/`     characters as path separators, however `\` is a valid filename character on posix systems. By first     creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it was thus possible to bypass     node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an     arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary     file creation and overwrite. Additionally, a similar confusion could arise on case-insensitive     filesystems. If a tar archive contained a directory at `FOO`, followed by a symbolic link named `foo`,     then on case-insensitive file systems, the creation of the symbolic link would remove the directory from     the filesystem, but _not_ from the internal directory cache, as it would not be treated as a cache hit. A     subsequent file entry within the `FOO` directory would then be placed in the target of the symbolic link,     thinking that the directory had already been created. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.16,     5.0.8 and 6.1.7. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these     issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar.
    If this is not possible, a workaround is available in the referenced GHSA-9r2w-394v-53qc. (CVE-2021-37701)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.18, 5.0.10, and 6.1.9 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by     ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat     calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
    This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with     names containing unicode values that normalized to the same value. Additionally, on Windows systems, long     path portions would resolve to the same file system entities as their 8.3 short path counterparts. A     specially crafted tar archive could thus include a directory with one form of the path, followed by a     symbolic link with a different string that resolves to the same file system entity, followed by a file     using the first form. By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink that     had a different apparent name that resolved to the same entry in the filesystem, it was thus possible to     bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into     an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing     arbitrary file creation and overwrite. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.18, 5.0.10 and 6.1.9.
    The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these issues. If you are     still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar. If this is not     possible, a workaround is available in the referenced GHSA-qq89-hq3f-393p. (CVE-2021-37712)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.18, 5.0.10, and 6.1.9 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be outside of the extraction target directory is not extracted. This is, in part,     accomplished by sanitizing absolute paths of entries within the archive, skipping archive entries that     contain `..` path portions, and resolving the sanitized paths against the extraction target directory.
    This logic was insufficient on Windows systems when extracting tar files that contained a path that was     not an absolute path, but specified a drive letter different from the extraction target, such as     `C:some\path`. If the drive letter does not match the extraction target, for example `D:\extraction\dir`,     then the result of `path.resolve(extractionDirectory, entryPath)` would resolve against the current     working directory on the `C:` drive, rather than the extraction target directory. Additionally, a `..`     portion of the path could occur immediately after the drive letter, such as `C:../foo`, and was not     properly sanitized by the logic that checked for `..` within the normalized and split portions of the     path. This only affects users of `node-tar` on Windows systems. These issues were addressed in releases     4.4.18, 5.0.10 and 6.1.9. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for     these issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of     node-tar. There is no reasonable way to work around this issue without performing the same path     normalization procedures that node-tar now does. Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched     versions of node-tar, rather than attempt to sanitize paths themselves. (CVE-2021-37713)

  - `@npmcli/arborist`, the library that calculates dependency trees and manages the `node_modules` folder     hierarchy for the npm command line interface, aims to guarantee that package dependency contracts will be     met, and the extraction of package contents will always be performed into the expected folder. This is, in     part, accomplished by resolving dependency specifiers defined in `package.json` manifests for dependencies     with a specific name, and nesting folders to resolve conflicting dependencies. When multiple dependencies     differ only in the case of their name, Arborist's internal data structure saw them as separate items that     could coexist within the same level in the `node_modules` hierarchy. However, on case-insensitive file     systems (such as macOS and Windows), this is not the case. Combined with a symlink dependency such as     `file:/some/path`, this allowed an attacker to create a situation in which arbitrary contents could be     written to any location on the filesystem. For example, a package `pwn-a` could define a dependency in     their `package.json` file such as `foo: file:/some/path`. Another package, `pwn-b` could define a     dependency such as `FOO: file:foo.tgz`. On case-insensitive file systems, if `pwn-a` was installed, and     then `pwn-b` was installed afterwards, the contents of `foo.tgz` would be written to `/some/path`, and any     existing contents of `/some/path` would be removed. Anyone using npm v7.20.6 or earlier on a case-     insensitive filesystem is potentially affected. This is patched in @npmcli/arborist 2.8.2 which is     included in npm v7.20.7 and above. (CVE-2021-39134)

  - `@npmcli/arborist`, the library that calculates dependency trees and manages the node_modules folder     hierarchy for the npm command line interface, aims to guarantee that package dependency contracts will be     met, and the extraction of package contents will always be performed into the expected folder. This is     accomplished by extracting package contents into a project's `node_modules` folder. If the `node_modules`     folder of the root project or any of its dependencies is somehow replaced with a symbolic link, it could     allow Arborist to write package dependencies to any arbitrary location on the file system. Note that     symbolic links contained within package artifact contents are filtered out, so another means of creating a     `node_modules` symbolic link would have to be employed. 1. A `preinstall` script could replace     `node_modules` with a symlink. (This is prevented by using `--ignore-scripts`.) 2. An attacker could     supply the target with a git repository, instructing them to run `npm install --ignore-scripts` in the     root. This may be successful, because `npm install --ignore-scripts` is typically not capable of making     changes outside of the project directory, so it may be deemed safe. This is patched in @npmcli/arborist     2.8.2 which is included in npm v7.20.7 and above. For more information including workarounds please see     the referenced GHSA-gmw6-94gg-2rc2. (CVE-2021-39135)

  - Accepting arbitrary Subject Alternative Name (SAN) types, unless a PKI is specifically defined to use a     particular SAN type, can result in bypassing name-constrained intermediates. Node.js < 12.22.9, < 14.18.3,     < 16.13.2, and < 17.3.1 was accepting URI SAN types, which PKIs are often not defined to use.
    Additionally, when a protocol allows URI SANs, Node.js did not match the URI correctly.Versions of Node.js     with the fix for this disable the URI SAN type when checking a certificate against a hostname. This     behavior can be reverted through the --security-revert command-line option. (CVE-2021-44531)

  - Node.js < 12.22.9, < 14.18.3, < 16.13.2, and < 17.3.1 converts SANs (Subject Alternative Names) to a     string format. It uses this string to check peer certificates against hostnames when validating     connections. The string format was subject to an injection vulnerability when name constraints were used     within a certificate chain, allowing the bypass of these name constraints.Versions of Node.js with the fix     for this escape SANs containing the problematic characters in order to prevent the injection. This     behavior can be reverted through the --security-revert command-line option. (CVE-2021-44532)

  - Node.js < 12.22.9, < 14.18.3, < 16.13.2, and < 17.3.1 did not handle multi-value Relative Distinguished     Names correctly. Attackers could craft certificate subjects containing a single-value Relative     Distinguished Name that would be interpreted as a multi-value Relative Distinguished Name, for example, in     order to inject a Common Name that would allow bypassing the certificate subject verification.Affected     versions of Node.js that do not accept multi-value Relative Distinguished Names and are thus not     vulnerable to such attacks themselves. However, third-party code that uses node's ambiguous presentation     of certificate subjects may be vulnerable. (CVE-2021-44533)

  - Due to the formatting logic of the console.table() function it was not safe to allow user controlled     input to be passed to the properties parameter while simultaneously passing a plain object with at least     one property as the first parameter, which could be __proto__. The prototype pollution has very limited     control, in that it only allows an empty string to be assigned to numerical keys of the object     prototype.Node.js >= 12.22.9, >= 14.18.3, >= 16.13.2, and >= 17.3.1 use a null protoype for the object     these properties are being assigned to. (CVE-2022-21824)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The remote SUSE Linux SUSE15 host has packages installed that are affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the openSUSE-SU-2021:1574-1 advisory.

  - The parser in accepts requests with a space (SP) right after the header name before the colon. This can     lead to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS) in llhttp < v2.1.4 and < v6.0.6. (CVE-2021-22959)

  - The parse function in llhttp < 2.1.4 and < 6.0.6. ignores chunk extensions when parsing the body of     chunked requests. This leads to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS) under certain conditions. (CVE-2021-22960)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.16, 5.0.8, and 6.1.7 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by     ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat     calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
    This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with     the same name as the directory, where the symlink and directory names in the archive entry used     backslashes as a path separator on posix systems. The cache checking logic used both `\` and `/`     characters as path separators, however `\` is a valid filename character on posix systems. By first     creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it was thus possible to bypass     node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an     arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary     file creation and overwrite. Additionally, a similar confusion could arise on case-insensitive     filesystems. If a tar archive contained a directory at `FOO`, followed by a symbolic link named `foo`,     then on case-insensitive file systems, the creation of the symbolic link would remove the directory from     the filesystem, but _not_ from the internal directory cache, as it would not be treated as a cache hit. A     subsequent file entry within the `FOO` directory would then be placed in the target of the symbolic link,     thinking that the directory had already been created. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.16,     5.0.8 and 6.1.7. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these     issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar.
    If this is not possible, a workaround is available in the referenced GHSA-9r2w-394v-53qc. (CVE-2021-37701)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.18, 5.0.10, and 6.1.9 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by     ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat     calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
    This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with     names containing unicode values that normalized to the same value. Additionally, on Windows systems, long     path portions would resolve to the same file system entities as their 8.3 short path counterparts. A     specially crafted tar archive could thus include a directory with one form of the path, followed by a     symbolic link with a different string that resolves to the same file system entity, followed by a file     using the first form. By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink that     had a different apparent name that resolved to the same entry in the filesystem, it was thus possible to     bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into     an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing     arbitrary file creation and overwrite. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.18, 5.0.10 and 6.1.9.
    The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these issues. If you are     still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar. If this is not     possible, a workaround is available in the referenced GHSA-qq89-hq3f-393p. (CVE-2021-37712)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.18, 5.0.10, and 6.1.9 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be outside of the extraction target directory is not extracted. This is, in part,     accomplished by sanitizing absolute paths of entries within the archive, skipping archive entries that     contain `..` path portions, and resolving the sanitized paths against the extraction target directory.
    This logic was insufficient on Windows systems when extracting tar files that contained a path that was     not an absolute path, but specified a drive letter different from the extraction target, such as     `C:some\path`. If the drive letter does not match the extraction target, for example `D:\extraction\dir`,     then the result of `path.resolve(extractionDirectory, entryPath)` would resolve against the current     working directory on the `C:` drive, rather than the extraction target directory. Additionally, a `..`     portion of the path could occur immediately after the drive letter, such as `C:../foo`, and was not     properly sanitized by the logic that checked for `..` within the normalized and split portions of the     path. This only affects users of `node-tar` on Windows systems. These issues were addressed in releases     4.4.18, 5.0.10 and 6.1.9. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for     these issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of     node-tar. There is no reasonable way to work around this issue without performing the same path     normalization procedures that node-tar now does. Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched     versions of node-tar, rather than attempt to sanitize paths themselves. (CVE-2021-37713)

  - `@npmcli/arborist`, the library that calculates dependency trees and manages the `node_modules` folder     hierarchy for the npm command line interface, aims to guarantee that package dependency contracts will be     met, and the extraction of package contents will always be performed into the expected folder. This is, in     part, accomplished by resolving dependency specifiers defined in `package.json` manifests for dependencies     with a specific name, and nesting folders to resolve conflicting dependencies. When multiple dependencies     differ only in the case of their name, Arborist's internal data structure saw them as separate items that     could coexist within the same level in the `node_modules` hierarchy. However, on case-insensitive file     systems (such as macOS and Windows), this is not the case. Combined with a symlink dependency such as     `file:/some/path`, this allowed an attacker to create a situation in which arbitrary contents could be     written to any location on the filesystem. For example, a package `pwn-a` could define a dependency in     their `package.json` file such as `foo: file:/some/path`. Another package, `pwn-b` could define a     dependency such as `FOO: file:foo.tgz`. On case-insensitive file systems, if `pwn-a` was installed, and     then `pwn-b` was installed afterwards, the contents of `foo.tgz` would be written to `/some/path`, and any     existing contents of `/some/path` would be removed. Anyone using npm v7.20.6 or earlier on a case-     insensitive filesystem is potentially affected. This is patched in @npmcli/arborist 2.8.2 which is     included in npm v7.20.7 and above. (CVE-2021-39134)

  - `@npmcli/arborist`, the library that calculates dependency trees and manages the node_modules folder     hierarchy for the npm command line interface, aims to guarantee that package dependency contracts will be     met, and the extraction of package contents will always be performed into the expected folder. This is     accomplished by extracting package contents into a project's `node_modules` folder. If the `node_modules`     folder of the root project or any of its dependencies is somehow replaced with a symbolic link, it could     allow Arborist to write package dependencies to any arbitrary location on the file system. Note that     symbolic links contained within package artifact contents are filtered out, so another means of creating a     `node_modules` symbolic link would have to be employed. 1. A `preinstall` script could replace     `node_modules` with a symlink. (This is prevented by using `--ignore-scripts`.) 2. An attacker could     supply the target with a git repository, instructing them to run `npm install --ignore-scripts` in the     root. This may be successful, because `npm install --ignore-scripts` is typically not capable of making     changes outside of the project directory, so it may be deemed safe. This is patched in @npmcli/arborist     2.8.2 which is included in npm v7.20.7 and above. For more information including workarounds please see     the referenced GHSA-gmw6-94gg-2rc2. (CVE-2021-39135)

Note that Nessus has not tested for this issue but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The remote SUSE Linux SUSE15 host has packages installed that are affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the openSUSE-SU-2021:3964-1 advisory.

  - The parser in accepts requests with a space (SP) right after the header name before the colon. This can     lead to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS) in llhttp < v2.1.4 and < v6.0.6. (CVE-2021-22959)

  - The parse function in llhttp < 2.1.4 and < 6.0.6. ignores chunk extensions when parsing the body of     chunked requests. This leads to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS) under certain conditions. (CVE-2021-22960)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.16, 5.0.8, and 6.1.7 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by     ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat     calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
    This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with     the same name as the directory, where the symlink and directory names in the archive entry used     backslashes as a path separator on posix systems. The cache checking logic used both `\` and `/`     characters as path separators, however `\` is a valid filename character on posix systems. By first     creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it was thus possible to bypass     node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an     arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary     file creation and overwrite. Additionally, a similar confusion could arise on case-insensitive     filesystems. If a tar archive contained a directory at `FOO`, followed by a symbolic link named `foo`,     then on case-insensitive file systems, the creation of the symbolic link would remove the directory from     the filesystem, but _not_ from the internal directory cache, as it would not be treated as a cache hit. A     subsequent file entry within the `FOO` directory would then be placed in the target of the symbolic link,     thinking that the directory had already been created. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.16,     5.0.8 and 6.1.7. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these     issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar.
    If this is not possible, a workaround is available in the referenced GHSA-9r2w-394v-53qc. (CVE-2021-37701)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.18, 5.0.10, and 6.1.9 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by     ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat     calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
    This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with     names containing unicode values that normalized to the same value. Additionally, on Windows systems, long     path portions would resolve to the same file system entities as their 8.3 short path counterparts. A     specially crafted tar archive could thus include a directory with one form of the path, followed by a     symbolic link with a different string that resolves to the same file system entity, followed by a file     using the first form. By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink that     had a different apparent name that resolved to the same entry in the filesystem, it was thus possible to     bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into     an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing     arbitrary file creation and overwrite. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.18, 5.0.10 and 6.1.9.
    The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these issues. If you are     still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar. If this is not     possible, a workaround is available in the referenced GHSA-qq89-hq3f-393p. (CVE-2021-37712)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.18, 5.0.10, and 6.1.9 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be outside of the extraction target directory is not extracted. This is, in part,     accomplished by sanitizing absolute paths of entries within the archive, skipping archive entries that     contain `..` path portions, and resolving the sanitized paths against the extraction target directory.
    This logic was insufficient on Windows systems when extracting tar files that contained a path that was     not an absolute path, but specified a drive letter different from the extraction target, such as     `C:some\path`. If the drive letter does not match the extraction target, for example `D:\extraction\dir`,     then the result of `path.resolve(extractionDirectory, entryPath)` would resolve against the current     working directory on the `C:` drive, rather than the extraction target directory. Additionally, a `..`     portion of the path could occur immediately after the drive letter, such as `C:../foo`, and was not     properly sanitized by the logic that checked for `..` within the normalized and split portions of the     path. This only affects users of `node-tar` on Windows systems. These issues were addressed in releases     4.4.18, 5.0.10 and 6.1.9. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for     these issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of     node-tar. There is no reasonable way to work around this issue without performing the same path     normalization procedures that node-tar now does. Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched     versions of node-tar, rather than attempt to sanitize paths themselves. (CVE-2021-37713)

  - `@npmcli/arborist`, the library that calculates dependency trees and manages the `node_modules` folder     hierarchy for the npm command line interface, aims to guarantee that package dependency contracts will be     met, and the extraction of package contents will always be performed into the expected folder. This is, in     part, accomplished by resolving dependency specifiers defined in `package.json` manifests for dependencies     with a specific name, and nesting folders to resolve conflicting dependencies. When multiple dependencies     differ only in the case of their name, Arborist's internal data structure saw them as separate items that     could coexist within the same level in the `node_modules` hierarchy. However, on case-insensitive file     systems (such as macOS and Windows), this is not the case. Combined with a symlink dependency such as     `file:/some/path`, this allowed an attacker to create a situation in which arbitrary contents could be     written to any location on the filesystem. For example, a package `pwn-a` could define a dependency in     their `package.json` file such as `foo: file:/some/path`. Another package, `pwn-b` could define a     dependency such as `FOO: file:foo.tgz`. On case-insensitive file systems, if `pwn-a` was installed, and     then `pwn-b` was installed afterwards, the contents of `foo.tgz` would be written to `/some/path`, and any     existing contents of `/some/path` would be removed. Anyone using npm v7.20.6 or earlier on a case-     insensitive filesystem is potentially affected. This is patched in @npmcli/arborist 2.8.2 which is     included in npm v7.20.7 and above. (CVE-2021-39134)

  - `@npmcli/arborist`, the library that calculates dependency trees and manages the node_modules folder     hierarchy for the npm command line interface, aims to guarantee that package dependency contracts will be     met, and the extraction of package contents will always be performed into the expected folder. This is     accomplished by extracting package contents into a project's `node_modules` folder. If the `node_modules`     folder of the root project or any of its dependencies is somehow replaced with a symbolic link, it could     allow Arborist to write package dependencies to any arbitrary location on the file system. Note that     symbolic links contained within package artifact contents are filtered out, so another means of creating a     `node_modules` symbolic link would have to be employed. 1. A `preinstall` script could replace     `node_modules` with a symlink. (This is prevented by using `--ignore-scripts`.) 2. An attacker could     supply the target with a git repository, instructing them to run `npm install --ignore-scripts` in the     root. This may be successful, because `npm install --ignore-scripts` is typically not capable of making     changes outside of the project directory, so it may be deemed safe. This is patched in @npmcli/arborist     2.8.2 which is included in npm v7.20.7 and above. For more information including workarounds please see     the referenced GHSA-gmw6-94gg-2rc2. (CVE-2021-39135)

Note that Nessus has not tested for this issue but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The remote SUSE Linux SLES15 host has packages installed that are affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the SUSE-SU-2021:3964-1 advisory.

  - The parser in accepts requests with a space (SP) right after the header name before the colon. This can     lead to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS) in llhttp < v2.1.4 and < v6.0.6. (CVE-2021-22959)

  - The parse function in llhttp < 2.1.4 and < 6.0.6. ignores chunk extensions when parsing the body of     chunked requests. This leads to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS) under certain conditions. (CVE-2021-22960)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.16, 5.0.8, and 6.1.7 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by     ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat     calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
    This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with     the same name as the directory, where the symlink and directory names in the archive entry used     backslashes as a path separator on posix systems. The cache checking logic used both `\` and `/`     characters as path separators, however `\` is a valid filename character on posix systems. By first     creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it was thus possible to bypass     node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an     arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary     file creation and overwrite. Additionally, a similar confusion could arise on case-insensitive     filesystems. If a tar archive contained a directory at `FOO`, followed by a symbolic link named `foo`,     then on case-insensitive file systems, the creation of the symbolic link would remove the directory from     the filesystem, but _not_ from the internal directory cache, as it would not be treated as a cache hit. A     subsequent file entry within the `FOO` directory would then be placed in the target of the symbolic link,     thinking that the directory had already been created. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.16,     5.0.8 and 6.1.7. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these     issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar.
    If this is not possible, a workaround is available in the referenced GHSA-9r2w-394v-53qc. (CVE-2021-37701)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.18, 5.0.10, and 6.1.9 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by     ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat     calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
    This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with     names containing unicode values that normalized to the same value. Additionally, on Windows systems, long     path portions would resolve to the same file system entities as their 8.3 short path counterparts. A     specially crafted tar archive could thus include a directory with one form of the path, followed by a     symbolic link with a different string that resolves to the same file system entity, followed by a file     using the first form. By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink that     had a different apparent name that resolved to the same entry in the filesystem, it was thus possible to     bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into     an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing     arbitrary file creation and overwrite. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.18, 5.0.10 and 6.1.9.
    The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these issues. If you are     still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar. If this is not     possible, a workaround is available in the referenced GHSA-qq89-hq3f-393p. (CVE-2021-37712)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.18, 5.0.10, and 6.1.9 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be outside of the extraction target directory is not extracted. This is, in part,     accomplished by sanitizing absolute paths of entries within the archive, skipping archive entries that     contain `..` path portions, and resolving the sanitized paths against the extraction target directory.
    This logic was insufficient on Windows systems when extracting tar files that contained a path that was     not an absolute path, but specified a drive letter different from the extraction target, such as     `C:some\path`. If the drive letter does not match the extraction target, for example `D:\extraction\dir`,     then the result of `path.resolve(extractionDirectory, entryPath)` would resolve against the current     working directory on the `C:` drive, rather than the extraction target directory. Additionally, a `..`     portion of the path could occur immediately after the drive letter, such as `C:../foo`, and was not     properly sanitized by the logic that checked for `..` within the normalized and split portions of the     path. This only affects users of `node-tar` on Windows systems. These issues were addressed in releases     4.4.18, 5.0.10 and 6.1.9. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for     these issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of     node-tar. There is no reasonable way to work around this issue without performing the same path     normalization procedures that node-tar now does. Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched     versions of node-tar, rather than attempt to sanitize paths themselves. (CVE-2021-37713)

  - `@npmcli/arborist`, the library that calculates dependency trees and manages the `node_modules` folder     hierarchy for the npm command line interface, aims to guarantee that package dependency contracts will be     met, and the extraction of package contents will always be performed into the expected folder. This is, in     part, accomplished by resolving dependency specifiers defined in `package.json` manifests for dependencies     with a specific name, and nesting folders to resolve conflicting dependencies. When multiple dependencies     differ only in the case of their name, Arborist's internal data structure saw them as separate items that     could coexist within the same level in the `node_modules` hierarchy. However, on case-insensitive file     systems (such as macOS and Windows), this is not the case. Combined with a symlink dependency such as     `file:/some/path`, this allowed an attacker to create a situation in which arbitrary contents could be     written to any location on the filesystem. For example, a package `pwn-a` could define a dependency in     their `package.json` file such as `foo: file:/some/path`. Another package, `pwn-b` could define a     dependency such as `FOO: file:foo.tgz`. On case-insensitive file systems, if `pwn-a` was installed, and     then `pwn-b` was installed afterwards, the contents of `foo.tgz` would be written to `/some/path`, and any     existing contents of `/some/path` would be removed. Anyone using npm v7.20.6 or earlier on a case-     insensitive filesystem is potentially affected. This is patched in @npmcli/arborist 2.8.2 which is     included in npm v7.20.7 and above. (CVE-2021-39134)

  - `@npmcli/arborist`, the library that calculates dependency trees and manages the node_modules folder     hierarchy for the npm command line interface, aims to guarantee that package dependency contracts will be     met, and the extraction of package contents will always be performed into the expected folder. This is     accomplished by extracting package contents into a project's `node_modules` folder. If the `node_modules`     folder of the root project or any of its dependencies is somehow replaced with a symbolic link, it could     allow Arborist to write package dependencies to any arbitrary location on the file system. Note that     symbolic links contained within package artifact contents are filtered out, so another means of creating a     `node_modules` symbolic link would have to be employed. 1. A `preinstall` script could replace     `node_modules` with a symlink. (This is prevented by using `--ignore-scripts`.) 2. An attacker could     supply the target with a git repository, instructing them to run `npm install --ignore-scripts` in the     root. This may be successful, because `npm install --ignore-scripts` is typically not capable of making     changes outside of the project directory, so it may be deemed safe. This is patched in @npmcli/arborist     2.8.2 which is included in npm v7.20.7 and above. For more information including workarounds please see     the referenced GHSA-gmw6-94gg-2rc2. (CVE-2021-39135)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The remote SUSE Linux SLES15 host has packages installed that are affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the SUSE-SU-2021:3940-1 advisory.

  - The parser in accepts requests with a space (SP) right after the header name before the colon. This can     lead to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS) in llhttp < v2.1.4 and < v6.0.6. (CVE-2021-22959)

  - The parse function in llhttp < 2.1.4 and < 6.0.6. ignores chunk extensions when parsing the body of     chunked requests. This leads to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS) under certain conditions. (CVE-2021-22960)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.16, 5.0.8, and 6.1.7 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by     ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat     calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
    This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with     the same name as the directory, where the symlink and directory names in the archive entry used     backslashes as a path separator on posix systems. The cache checking logic used both `\` and `/`     characters as path separators, however `\` is a valid filename character on posix systems. By first     creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it was thus possible to bypass     node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an     arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary     file creation and overwrite. Additionally, a similar confusion could arise on case-insensitive     filesystems. If a tar archive contained a directory at `FOO`, followed by a symbolic link named `foo`,     then on case-insensitive file systems, the creation of the symbolic link would remove the directory from     the filesystem, but _not_ from the internal directory cache, as it would not be treated as a cache hit. A     subsequent file entry within the `FOO` directory would then be placed in the target of the symbolic link,     thinking that the directory had already been created. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.16,     5.0.8 and 6.1.7. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these     issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar.
    If this is not possible, a workaround is available in the referenced GHSA-9r2w-394v-53qc. (CVE-2021-37701)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.18, 5.0.10, and 6.1.9 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by     ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat     calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
    This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with     names containing unicode values that normalized to the same value. Additionally, on Windows systems, long     path portions would resolve to the same file system entities as their 8.3 short path counterparts. A     specially crafted tar archive could thus include a directory with one form of the path, followed by a     symbolic link with a different string that resolves to the same file system entity, followed by a file     using the first form. By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink that     had a different apparent name that resolved to the same entry in the filesystem, it was thus possible to     bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into     an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing     arbitrary file creation and overwrite. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.18, 5.0.10 and 6.1.9.
    The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these issues. If you are     still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar. If this is not     possible, a workaround is available in the referenced GHSA-qq89-hq3f-393p. (CVE-2021-37712)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.18, 5.0.10, and 6.1.9 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be outside of the extraction target directory is not extracted. This is, in part,     accomplished by sanitizing absolute paths of entries within the archive, skipping archive entries that     contain `..` path portions, and resolving the sanitized paths against the extraction target directory.
    This logic was insufficient on Windows systems when extracting tar files that contained a path that was     not an absolute path, but specified a drive letter different from the extraction target, such as     `C:some\path`. If the drive letter does not match the extraction target, for example `D:\extraction\dir`,     then the result of `path.resolve(extractionDirectory, entryPath)` would resolve against the current     working directory on the `C:` drive, rather than the extraction target directory. Additionally, a `..`     portion of the path could occur immediately after the drive letter, such as `C:../foo`, and was not     properly sanitized by the logic that checked for `..` within the normalized and split portions of the     path. This only affects users of `node-tar` on Windows systems. These issues were addressed in releases     4.4.18, 5.0.10 and 6.1.9. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for     these issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of     node-tar. There is no reasonable way to work around this issue without performing the same path     normalization procedures that node-tar now does. Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched     versions of node-tar, rather than attempt to sanitize paths themselves. (CVE-2021-37713)

  - `@npmcli/arborist`, the library that calculates dependency trees and manages the `node_modules` folder     hierarchy for the npm command line interface, aims to guarantee that package dependency contracts will be     met, and the extraction of package contents will always be performed into the expected folder. This is, in     part, accomplished by resolving dependency specifiers defined in `package.json` manifests for dependencies     with a specific name, and nesting folders to resolve conflicting dependencies. When multiple dependencies     differ only in the case of their name, Arborist's internal data structure saw them as separate items that     could coexist within the same level in the `node_modules` hierarchy. However, on case-insensitive file     systems (such as macOS and Windows), this is not the case. Combined with a symlink dependency such as     `file:/some/path`, this allowed an attacker to create a situation in which arbitrary contents could be     written to any location on the filesystem. For example, a package `pwn-a` could define a dependency in     their `package.json` file such as `foo: file:/some/path`. Another package, `pwn-b` could define a     dependency such as `FOO: file:foo.tgz`. On case-insensitive file systems, if `pwn-a` was installed, and     then `pwn-b` was installed afterwards, the contents of `foo.tgz` would be written to `/some/path`, and any     existing contents of `/some/path` would be removed. Anyone using npm v7.20.6 or earlier on a case-     insensitive filesystem is potentially affected. This is patched in @npmcli/arborist 2.8.2 which is     included in npm v7.20.7 and above. (CVE-2021-39134)

  - `@npmcli/arborist`, the library that calculates dependency trees and manages the node_modules folder     hierarchy for the npm command line interface, aims to guarantee that package dependency contracts will be     met, and the extraction of package contents will always be performed into the expected folder. This is     accomplished by extracting package contents into a project's `node_modules` folder. If the `node_modules`     folder of the root project or any of its dependencies is somehow replaced with a symbolic link, it could     allow Arborist to write package dependencies to any arbitrary location on the file system. Note that     symbolic links contained within package artifact contents are filtered out, so another means of creating a     `node_modules` symbolic link would have to be employed. 1. A `preinstall` script could replace     `node_modules` with a symlink. (This is prevented by using `--ignore-scripts`.) 2. An attacker could     supply the target with a git repository, instructing them to run `npm install --ignore-scripts` in the     root. This may be successful, because `npm install --ignore-scripts` is typically not capable of making     changes outside of the project directory, so it may be deemed safe. This is patched in @npmcli/arborist     2.8.2 which is included in npm v7.20.7 and above. For more information including workarounds please see     the referenced GHSA-gmw6-94gg-2rc2. (CVE-2021-39135)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The remote SUSE Linux SUSE15 host has packages installed that are affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the openSUSE-SU-2021:3940-1 advisory.

  - The parser in accepts requests with a space (SP) right after the header name before the colon. This can     lead to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS) in llhttp < v2.1.4 and < v6.0.6. (CVE-2021-22959)

  - The parse function in llhttp < 2.1.4 and < 6.0.6. ignores chunk extensions when parsing the body of     chunked requests. This leads to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS) under certain conditions. (CVE-2021-22960)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.16, 5.0.8, and 6.1.7 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by     ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat     calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
    This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with     the same name as the directory, where the symlink and directory names in the archive entry used     backslashes as a path separator on posix systems. The cache checking logic used both `\` and `/`     characters as path separators, however `\` is a valid filename character on posix systems. By first     creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it was thus possible to bypass     node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an     arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary     file creation and overwrite. Additionally, a similar confusion could arise on case-insensitive     filesystems. If a tar archive contained a directory at `FOO`, followed by a symbolic link named `foo`,     then on case-insensitive file systems, the creation of the symbolic link would remove the directory from     the filesystem, but _not_ from the internal directory cache, as it would not be treated as a cache hit. A     subsequent file entry within the `FOO` directory would then be placed in the target of the symbolic link,     thinking that the directory had already been created. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.16,     5.0.8 and 6.1.7. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these     issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar.
    If this is not possible, a workaround is available in the referenced GHSA-9r2w-394v-53qc. (CVE-2021-37701)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.18, 5.0.10, and 6.1.9 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by     ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat     calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
    This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with     names containing unicode values that normalized to the same value. Additionally, on Windows systems, long     path portions would resolve to the same file system entities as their 8.3 short path counterparts. A     specially crafted tar archive could thus include a directory with one form of the path, followed by a     symbolic link with a different string that resolves to the same file system entity, followed by a file     using the first form. By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink that     had a different apparent name that resolved to the same entry in the filesystem, it was thus possible to     bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into     an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing     arbitrary file creation and overwrite. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.18, 5.0.10 and 6.1.9.
    The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these issues. If you are     still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar. If this is not     possible, a workaround is available in the referenced GHSA-qq89-hq3f-393p. (CVE-2021-37712)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.18, 5.0.10, and 6.1.9 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be outside of the extraction target directory is not extracted. This is, in part,     accomplished by sanitizing absolute paths of entries within the archive, skipping archive entries that     contain `..` path portions, and resolving the sanitized paths against the extraction target directory.
    This logic was insufficient on Windows systems when extracting tar files that contained a path that was     not an absolute path, but specified a drive letter different from the extraction target, such as     `C:some\path`. If the drive letter does not match the extraction target, for example `D:\extraction\dir`,     then the result of `path.resolve(extractionDirectory, entryPath)` would resolve against the current     working directory on the `C:` drive, rather than the extraction target directory. Additionally, a `..`     portion of the path could occur immediately after the drive letter, such as `C:../foo`, and was not     properly sanitized by the logic that checked for `..` within the normalized and split portions of the     path. This only affects users of `node-tar` on Windows systems. These issues were addressed in releases     4.4.18, 5.0.10 and 6.1.9. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for     these issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of     node-tar. There is no reasonable way to work around this issue without performing the same path     normalization procedures that node-tar now does. Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched     versions of node-tar, rather than attempt to sanitize paths themselves. (CVE-2021-37713)

  - `@npmcli/arborist`, the library that calculates dependency trees and manages the `node_modules` folder     hierarchy for the npm command line interface, aims to guarantee that package dependency contracts will be     met, and the extraction of package contents will always be performed into the expected folder. This is, in     part, accomplished by resolving dependency specifiers defined in `package.json` manifests for dependencies     with a specific name, and nesting folders to resolve conflicting dependencies. When multiple dependencies     differ only in the case of their name, Arborist's internal data structure saw them as separate items that     could coexist within the same level in the `node_modules` hierarchy. However, on case-insensitive file     systems (such as macOS and Windows), this is not the case. Combined with a symlink dependency such as     `file:/some/path`, this allowed an attacker to create a situation in which arbitrary contents could be     written to any location on the filesystem. For example, a package `pwn-a` could define a dependency in     their `package.json` file such as `foo: file:/some/path`. Another package, `pwn-b` could define a     dependency such as `FOO: file:foo.tgz`. On case-insensitive file systems, if `pwn-a` was installed, and     then `pwn-b` was installed afterwards, the contents of `foo.tgz` would be written to `/some/path`, and any     existing contents of `/some/path` would be removed. Anyone using npm v7.20.6 or earlier on a case-     insensitive filesystem is potentially affected. This is patched in @npmcli/arborist 2.8.2 which is     included in npm v7.20.7 and above. (CVE-2021-39134)

  - `@npmcli/arborist`, the library that calculates dependency trees and manages the node_modules folder     hierarchy for the npm command line interface, aims to guarantee that package dependency contracts will be     met, and the extraction of package contents will always be performed into the expected folder. This is     accomplished by extracting package contents into a project's `node_modules` folder. If the `node_modules`     folder of the root project or any of its dependencies is somehow replaced with a symbolic link, it could     allow Arborist to write package dependencies to any arbitrary location on the file system. Note that     symbolic links contained within package artifact contents are filtered out, so another means of creating a     `node_modules` symbolic link would have to be employed. 1. A `preinstall` script could replace     `node_modules` with a symlink. (This is prevented by using `--ignore-scripts`.) 2. An attacker could     supply the target with a git repository, instructing them to run `npm install --ignore-scripts` in the     root. This may be successful, because `npm install --ignore-scripts` is typically not capable of making     changes outside of the project directory, so it may be deemed safe. This is patched in @npmcli/arborist     2.8.2 which is included in npm v7.20.7 and above. For more information including workarounds please see     the referenced GHSA-gmw6-94gg-2rc2. (CVE-2021-39135)

Note that Nessus has not tested for this issue but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The remote SUSE Linux SLES12 host has packages installed that are affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the SUSE-SU-2021:3886-1 advisory.

  - The parser in accepts requests with a space (SP) right after the header name before the colon. This can     lead to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS) in llhttp < v2.1.4 and < v6.0.6. (CVE-2021-22959)

  - The parse function in llhttp < 2.1.4 and < 6.0.6. ignores chunk extensions when parsing the body of     chunked requests. This leads to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS) under certain conditions. (CVE-2021-22960)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.16, 5.0.8, and 6.1.7 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by     ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat     calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
    This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with     the same name as the directory, where the symlink and directory names in the archive entry used     backslashes as a path separator on posix systems. The cache checking logic used both `\` and `/`     characters as path separators, however `\` is a valid filename character on posix systems. By first     creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it was thus possible to bypass     node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an     arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary     file creation and overwrite. Additionally, a similar confusion could arise on case-insensitive     filesystems. If a tar archive contained a directory at `FOO`, followed by a symbolic link named `foo`,     then on case-insensitive file systems, the creation of the symbolic link would remove the directory from     the filesystem, but _not_ from the internal directory cache, as it would not be treated as a cache hit. A     subsequent file entry within the `FOO` directory would then be placed in the target of the symbolic link,     thinking that the directory had already been created. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.16,     5.0.8 and 6.1.7. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these     issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar.
    If this is not possible, a workaround is available in the referenced GHSA-9r2w-394v-53qc. (CVE-2021-37701)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.18, 5.0.10, and 6.1.9 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by     ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat     calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
    This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with     names containing unicode values that normalized to the same value. Additionally, on Windows systems, long     path portions would resolve to the same file system entities as their 8.3 short path counterparts. A     specially crafted tar archive could thus include a directory with one form of the path, followed by a     symbolic link with a different string that resolves to the same file system entity, followed by a file     using the first form. By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink that     had a different apparent name that resolved to the same entry in the filesystem, it was thus possible to     bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into     an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing     arbitrary file creation and overwrite. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.18, 5.0.10 and 6.1.9.
    The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these issues. If you are     still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar. If this is not     possible, a workaround is available in the referenced GHSA-qq89-hq3f-393p. (CVE-2021-37712)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.18, 5.0.10, and 6.1.9 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be outside of the extraction target directory is not extracted. This is, in part,     accomplished by sanitizing absolute paths of entries within the archive, skipping archive entries that     contain `..` path portions, and resolving the sanitized paths against the extraction target directory.
    This logic was insufficient on Windows systems when extracting tar files that contained a path that was     not an absolute path, but specified a drive letter different from the extraction target, such as     `C:some\path`. If the drive letter does not match the extraction target, for example `D:\extraction\dir`,     then the result of `path.resolve(extractionDirectory, entryPath)` would resolve against the current     working directory on the `C:` drive, rather than the extraction target directory. Additionally, a `..`     portion of the path could occur immediately after the drive letter, such as `C:../foo`, and was not     properly sanitized by the logic that checked for `..` within the normalized and split portions of the     path. This only affects users of `node-tar` on Windows systems. These issues were addressed in releases     4.4.18, 5.0.10 and 6.1.9. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for     these issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of     node-tar. There is no reasonable way to work around this issue without performing the same path     normalization procedures that node-tar now does. Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched     versions of node-tar, rather than attempt to sanitize paths themselves. (CVE-2021-37713)

  - `@npmcli/arborist`, the library that calculates dependency trees and manages the `node_modules` folder     hierarchy for the npm command line interface, aims to guarantee that package dependency contracts will be     met, and the extraction of package contents will always be performed into the expected folder. This is, in     part, accomplished by resolving dependency specifiers defined in `package.json` manifests for dependencies     with a specific name, and nesting folders to resolve conflicting dependencies. When multiple dependencies     differ only in the case of their name, Arborist's internal data structure saw them as separate items that     could coexist within the same level in the `node_modules` hierarchy. However, on case-insensitive file     systems (such as macOS and Windows), this is not the case. Combined with a symlink dependency such as     `file:/some/path`, this allowed an attacker to create a situation in which arbitrary contents could be     written to any location on the filesystem. For example, a package `pwn-a` could define a dependency in     their `package.json` file such as `foo: file:/some/path`. Another package, `pwn-b` could define a     dependency such as `FOO: file:foo.tgz`. On case-insensitive file systems, if `pwn-a` was installed, and     then `pwn-b` was installed afterwards, the contents of `foo.tgz` would be written to `/some/path`, and any     existing contents of `/some/path` would be removed. Anyone using npm v7.20.6 or earlier on a case-     insensitive filesystem is potentially affected. This is patched in @npmcli/arborist 2.8.2 which is     included in npm v7.20.7 and above. (CVE-2021-39134)

  - `@npmcli/arborist`, the library that calculates dependency trees and manages the node_modules folder     hierarchy for the npm command line interface, aims to guarantee that package dependency contracts will be     met, and the extraction of package contents will always be performed into the expected folder. This is     accomplished by extracting package contents into a project's `node_modules` folder. If the `node_modules`     folder of the root project or any of its dependencies is somehow replaced with a symbolic link, it could     allow Arborist to write package dependencies to any arbitrary location on the file system. Note that     symbolic links contained within package artifact contents are filtered out, so another means of creating a     `node_modules` symbolic link would have to be employed. 1. A `preinstall` script could replace     `node_modules` with a symlink. (This is prevented by using `--ignore-scripts`.) 2. An attacker could     supply the target with a git repository, instructing them to run `npm install --ignore-scripts` in the     root. This may be successful, because `npm install --ignore-scripts` is typically not capable of making     changes outside of the project directory, so it may be deemed safe. This is patched in @npmcli/arborist     2.8.2 which is included in npm v7.20.7 and above. For more information including workarounds please see     the referenced GHSA-gmw6-94gg-2rc2. (CVE-2021-39135)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The version of Node.js installed on the remote host is prior to 12.22.6 or 14.17.6. It is, therefore, affected by multiple remote code execution vulnerabilities in various components due to insufficient validation of user input. An unauthenticated, remote attacker can exploit this to bypass authentication and execute arbitrary commands. Additional impacts of these vulnerabilities include arbitrary file writing and creation. 

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

Node.js reports : npm 6 update - node-tar, arborist, npm cli modules These are vulnerabilities in the node-tar, arborist, and npm cli modules which are related to the initial reports and subsequent remediation of node-tar vulnerabilities CVE-2021-32803 and CVE-2021-32804. Subsequent internal security review of node-tar and additional external bounty reports have resulted in another 5 CVE being remediated in core npm CLI dependencies including node-tar, and npm arborist.

ID	Name	Product	Family	Severity
156806	SUSE SLES12 Security Update : nodejs12 (SUSE-SU-2022:0101-1)	Nessus	SuSE Local Security Checks	high
156130	openSUSE 15 Security Update : nodejs12 (openSUSE-SU-2021:1574-1)	Nessus	SuSE Local Security Checks	high
155934	openSUSE 15 Security Update : nodejs14 (openSUSE-SU-2021:3964-1)	Nessus	SuSE Local Security Checks	high
155933	SUSE SLES15 Security Update : nodejs14 (SUSE-SU-2021:3964-1)	Nessus	SuSE Local Security Checks	high
155907	SUSE SLES15 Security Update : nodejs12 (SUSE-SU-2021:3940-1)	Nessus	SuSE Local Security Checks	high
155878	openSUSE 15 Security Update : nodejs12 (openSUSE-SU-2021:3940-1)	Nessus	SuSE Local Security Checks	high
155834	SUSE SLES12 Security Update : nodejs14 (SUSE-SU-2021:3886-1)	Nessus	SuSE Local Security Checks	high
154232	Node.js Multiple Vulnerabilities (August 31st 2021 Security Releases)	Nessus	Misc.	high
153819	FreeBSD : Node.js -- August 2021 Security Releases (2) (7062bce0-1b17-11ec-9d9d-0022489ad614)	Nessus	FreeBSD Local Security Checks	high

Detections

Analytics

CVE-2021-37713

high

Tenable Plugins

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high

high