In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: enetc: Fix illegal access when reading affinity_hint irq_set_affinity_hit() stores a reference to the cpumask_t parameter in the irq descriptor, and that reference can be accessed later from irq_affinity_hint_proc_show(). Since the cpu_mask parameter passed to irq_set_affinity_hit() has only temporary storage (it's on the stack memory), later accesses to it are illegal. Thus reads from the corresponding procfs affinity_hint file can result in paging request oops. The issue is fixed by the get_cpu_mask() helper, which provides a permanent storage for the cpumask_t parameter.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7237a494decfa17d0b9d0076e6cee3235719de90
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6f329d9da2a5ae032fcde800a99b118124ed5270
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c3f1b741c6c2914ea120e3a5790d3e900152f7b
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c4c3052911b577920353a7646e4883d5da40c28