Cargo is a package manager for the rust programming language. It was discovered that Cargo did not limit the amount of data extracted from compressed archives. An attacker could upload to an alternate registry a specially crafted package that extracts way more data than its size (also known as a "zip bomb"), exhausting the disk space on the machine using Cargo to download the package. Note that by design Cargo allows code execution at build time, due to build scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerabilities in this advisory allow performing a subset of the possible damage in a harder to track down way. Your dependencies must still be trusted if you want to be protected from attacks, as it's possible to perform the same attacks with build scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerability is present in all versions of Cargo. Rust 1.64, to be released on September 22nd, will include a fix for it. Since the vulnerability is just a more limited way to accomplish what a malicious build scripts or procedural macros can do, we decided not to publish Rust point releases backporting the security fix. Patch files are available for Rust 1.63.0 are available in the wg-security-response repository for people building their own toolchain. We recommend users of alternate registries to excercise care in which package they download, by only including trusted dependencies in their projects. Please note that even with these vulnerabilities fixed, by design Cargo allows arbitrary code execution at build time thanks to build scripts and procedural macros: a malicious dependency will be able to cause damage regardless of these vulnerabilities. crates.io implemented server-side checks to reject these kinds of packages years ago, and there are no packages on crates.io exploiting these vulnerabilities. crates.io users still need to excercise care in choosing their dependencies though, as the same concerns about build scripts and procedural macros apply here.

It is, therefore, affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the ALAS2023-2023-109 advisory.

    2024-02-15: CVE-2022-36113 was added to this advisory.

    2024-02-15: CVE-2022-36114 was added to this advisory.

    Cargo is a package manager for the rust programming language. After a package is downloaded, Cargo     extracts its source code in the ~/.cargo folder on disk, making it available to the Rust projects it     builds. To record when an extraction is successful, Cargo writes ok to the .cargo-ok file at the root of     the extracted source code once it extracted all the files. It was discovered that Cargo allowed packages     to contain a .cargo-ok symbolic link, which Cargo would extract. Then, when Cargo attempted to write ok     into .cargo-ok, it would actually replace the first two bytes of the file the symlink pointed to with ok.
    This would allow an attacker to corrupt one file onthe machine using Cargo to extract the package. Note     that by design Cargo allows code execution at build time, due to build scripts and procedural macros. The     vulnerabilities in this advisory allow performing a subset of the possible damage in a harder to track     down way. Your dependencies must still be trusted if you want to be protected from attacks, as its     possible to perform the same attacks with build scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerabilityis present     in all versions of Cargo. Rust 1.64, to be released on September 22nd, will include a fix for it. Since     the vulnerability is just a more limited way to accomplish what a malicious build scripts or procedural     macros cando, we decided not to publish Rust point releases backporting the security fix. Patch files are     available for Rust 1.63.0 are available in the wg-security-response repository for people building their     own toolchain. Mitigations Werecommend users of alternate registries to exercise care in which package     they download, by only including trusted dependencies in their projects. Please note that even with these     vulnerabilities fixed, by design Cargo allows arbitrary code execution at build time thanks to build     scripts and procedural macros: a malicious dependency will be able to cause damage regardless of these     vulnerabilities. crates.io implemented server-side checks to reject these kinds of packages years ago, and     there are no packages on crates.io exploiting these vulnerabilities. crates.io users still need to     exercise care in choosing their dependencies though, as remote code execution is allowed by designthere as     well. (CVE-2022-36113)

    Cargo is a package manager for the rust programming language. It was discovered that Cargo did not limit     the amount of data extracted from compressed archives. An attacker could upload to an alternate registry a     specially crafted package that extracts way more data than its size (also known as a zip bomb),     exhausting the disk space on the machine using Cargo to download the package. Note that by design Cargo     allows code execution at buildtime, due to build scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerabilities in     this advisory allow performing a subset of the possible damage in a harder to track down way. Your     dependencies must still be trusted if you want to be protected from attacks, as its possible to perform     the same attacks with build scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerability is present in all versions of     Cargo. Rust 1.64, to be released on September 22nd, will include a fix for it. Since the vulnerability is     just a more limited way to accomplish what a malicious build scripts or procedural macros can do, we     decided not to publish Rust point releases backporting the security fix. Patch files are availablefor Rust     1.63.0 are available in the wg-security-response repository for people building their own toolchain. We     recommend users of alternate registries to excercise care in which package they download, by only     including trusted dependencies in their projects. Please note that even with these vulnerabilities fixed,     by design Cargo allows arbitrary code execution at build time thanks to build scripts and procedural     macros: a malicious dependency will be able to cause damage regardless of these vulnerabilities. crates.io     implemented server-side checks to reject these kinds of packages years ago, and there are no packages on     crates.io exploiting these vulnerabilities. crates.io usersstill need to excercise care in choosing their     dependencies though, as the same concerns about build scripts and procedural macros apply here.
    (CVE-2022-36114)

    Cargo is a Rust package manager. The Rust Security Response WG was notified that Cargo did not perform SSH     host key verification when cloning indexes and dependencies via SSH. An attacker could exploit this to     perform man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. This vulnerability has been assigned CVE-2022-46176. All Rust     versions containing Cargo before 1.66.1 are vulnerable. Note that even if you don't explicitly use SSH for     alternate registry indexes or crate dependencies, you might be affected by this vulnerability if you have     configured git to replace HTTPS connections to GitHub with SSH (through git's [][1] setting), as that'd     cause you to clone the crates.io index through SSH. Rust 1.66.1 will ensure Cargo checks the SSH host key     and abort the connection if the server's public key is not already trusted. We recommend everyone to     upgrade as soon as possible. (CVE-2022-46176)

Tenable has extracted the preceding description block directly from the tested product security advisory.

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The version of rust installed on the remote host is prior to 1.66.1-1. It is, therefore, affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the ALAS2-2023-1959 advisory.

    Cargo is a package manager for the rust programming language. After a package is downloaded, Cargo     extracts its source code in the ~/.cargo folder on disk, making it available to the Rust projects it     builds. To record when an extraction is successful, Cargo writes ok to the .cargo-ok file at the root of     the extracted source code once it extracted all the files. It was discovered that Cargo allowed packages     to contain a .cargo-ok symbolic link, which Cargo would extract. Then, when Cargo attempted to write ok     into .cargo-ok, it would actually replace the first two bytes of the file the symlink pointed to with ok.
    This would allow an attacker to corrupt one file onthe machine using Cargo to extract the package. Note     that by design Cargo allows code execution at build time, due to build scripts and procedural macros. The     vulnerabilities in this advisory allow performing a subset of the possible damage in a harder to track     down way. Your dependencies must still be trusted if you want to be protected from attacks, as its     possible to perform the same attacks with build scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerabilityis present     in all versions of Cargo. Rust 1.64, to be released on September 22nd, will include a fix for it. Since     the vulnerability is just a more limited way to accomplish what a malicious build scripts or procedural     macros cando, we decided not to publish Rust point releases backporting the security fix. Patch files are     available for Rust 1.63.0 are available in the wg-security-response repository for people building their     own toolchain. Mitigations Werecommend users of alternate registries to exercise care in which package     they download, by only including trusted dependencies in their projects. Please note that even with these     vulnerabilities fixed, by design Cargo allows arbitrary code execution at build time thanks to build     scripts and procedural macros: a malicious dependency will be able to cause damage regardless of these     vulnerabilities. crates.io implemented server-side checks to reject these kinds of packages years ago, and     there are no packages on crates.io exploiting these vulnerabilities. crates.io users still need to     exercise care in choosing their dependencies though, as remote code execution is allowed by designthere as     well. (CVE-2022-36113)

    Cargo is a package manager for the rust programming language. It was discovered that Cargo did not limit     the amount of data extracted from compressed archives. An attacker could upload to an alternate registry a     specially crafted package that extracts way more data than its size (also known as a zip bomb),     exhausting the disk space on the machine using Cargo to download the package. Note that by design Cargo     allows code execution at buildtime, due to build scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerabilities in     this advisory allow performing a subset of the possible damage in a harder to track down way. Your     dependencies must still be trusted if you want to be protected from attacks, as its possible to perform     the same attacks with build scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerability is present in all versions of     Cargo. Rust 1.64, to be released on September 22nd, will include a fix for it. Since the vulnerability is     just a more limited way to accomplish what a malicious build scripts or procedural macros can do, we     decided not to publish Rust point releases backporting the security fix. Patch files are availablefor Rust     1.63.0 are available in the wg-security-response repository for people building their own toolchain. We     recommend users of alternate registries to excercise care in which package they download, by only     including trusted dependencies in their projects. Please note that even with these vulnerabilities fixed,     by design Cargo allows arbitrary code execution at build time thanks to build scripts and procedural     macros: a malicious dependency will be able to cause damage regardless of these vulnerabilities. crates.io     implemented server-side checks to reject these kinds of packages years ago, and there are no packages on     crates.io exploiting these vulnerabilities. crates.io usersstill need to excercise care in choosing their     dependencies though, as the same concerns about build scripts and procedural macros apply here.
    (CVE-2022-36114)

Tenable has extracted the preceding description block directly from the tested product security advisory.

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The remote host is affected by the vulnerability described in GLSA-202210-09 (Rust: Multiple Vulnerabilities)

  - In the standard library in Rust before 1.50.0, read_to_end() does not validate the return value from Read     in an unsafe context. This bug could lead to a buffer overflow. (CVE-2021-28875)

  - In the standard library in Rust before 1.52.0, the Zip implementation has a panic safety issue. It calls
    __iterator_get_unchecked() more than once for the same index when the underlying iterator panics (in     certain conditions). This bug could lead to a memory safety violation due to an unmet safety requirement     for the TrustedRandomAccess trait. (CVE-2021-28876)

  - In the standard library in Rust before 1.51.0, the Zip implementation calls __iterator_get_unchecked() for     the same index more than once when nested. This bug can lead to a memory safety violation due to an unmet     safety requirement for the TrustedRandomAccess trait. (CVE-2021-28877)

  - In the standard library in Rust before 1.52.0, the Zip implementation calls __iterator_get_unchecked()     more than once for the same index (under certain conditions) when next_back() and next() are used     together. This bug could lead to a memory safety violation due to an unmet safety requirement for the     TrustedRandomAccess trait. (CVE-2021-28878)

  - In the standard library in Rust before 1.52.0, the Zip implementation can report an incorrect size due to     an integer overflow. This bug can lead to a buffer overflow when a consumed Zip iterator is used again.
    (CVE-2021-28879)

  - library/std/src/net/parser.rs in Rust before 1.53.0 does not properly consider extraneous zero characters     at the beginning of an IP address string, which (in some situations) allows attackers to bypass access     control that is based on IP addresses, because of unexpected octal interpretation. (CVE-2021-29922)

  - In the standard library in Rust before 1.52.0, a double free can occur in the Vec::from_iter function if     freeing the element panics. (CVE-2021-31162)

  - Dell EMC Avamar Server version 19.4 contains a plain-text password storage vulnerability in AvInstaller. A     local attacker could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to the disclosure of certain user     credentials. The attacker may be able to use the exposed credentials to access the vulnerable application     with privileges of the compromised account. (CVE-2021-36317)

  - Dell EMC Avamar versions 18.2,19.1,19.2,19.3,19.4 contain a plain-text password storage vulnerability. A     high privileged user could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to a complete outage.
    (CVE-2021-36318)

  - ** DISPUTED ** An issue was discovered in the Bidirectional Algorithm in the Unicode Specification through     14.0. It permits the visual reordering of characters via control sequences, which can be used to craft     source code that renders different logic than the logical ordering of tokens ingested by compilers and     interpreters. Adversaries can leverage this to encode source code for compilers accepting Unicode such     that targeted vulnerabilities are introduced invisibly to human reviewers. NOTE: the Unicode Consortium     offers the following alternative approach to presenting this concern. An issue is noted in the nature of     international text that can affect applications that implement support for The Unicode Standard and the     Unicode Bidirectional Algorithm (all versions). Due to text display behavior when text includes left-to-     right and right-to-left characters, the visual order of tokens may be different from their logical order.
    Additionally, control characters needed to fully support the requirements of bidirectional text can     further obfuscate the logical order of tokens. Unless mitigated, an adversary could craft source code such     that the ordering of tokens perceived by human reviewers does not match what will be processed by a     compiler/interpreter/etc. The Unicode Consortium has documented this class of vulnerability in its     document, Unicode Technical Report #36, Unicode Security Considerations. The Unicode Consortium also     provides guidance on mitigations for this class of issues in Unicode Technical Standard #39, Unicode     Security Mechanisms, and in Unicode Standard Annex #31, Unicode Identifier and Pattern Syntax. Also, the     BIDI specification allows applications to tailor the implementation in ways that can mitigate misleading     visual reordering in program text; see HL4 in Unicode Standard Annex #9, Unicode Bidirectional Algorithm.
    (CVE-2021-42574)

  - ** DISPUTED ** An issue was discovered in the character definitions of the Unicode Specification through     14.0. The specification allows an adversary to produce source code identifiers such as function names     using homoglyphs that render visually identical to a target identifier. Adversaries can leverage this to     inject code via adversarial identifier definitions in upstream software dependencies invoked deceptively     in downstream software. NOTE: the Unicode Consortium offers the following alternative approach to     presenting this concern. An issue is noted in the nature of international text that can affect     applications that implement support for The Unicode Standard (all versions). Unless mitigated, an     adversary could produce source code identifiers using homoglyph characters that render visually identical     to but are distinct from a target identifier. In this way, an adversary could inject adversarial     identifier definitions in upstream software that are not detected by human reviewers and are invoked     deceptively in downstream software. The Unicode Consortium has documented this class of security     vulnerability in its document, Unicode Technical Report #36, Unicode Security Considerations. The Unicode     Consortium also provides guidance on mitigations for this class of issues in Unicode Technical Standard     #39, Unicode Security Mechanisms. (CVE-2021-42694)

  - Rust is a multi-paradigm, general-purpose programming language designed for performance and safety,     especially safe concurrency. The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the `std::fs::remove_dir_all`     standard library function is vulnerable a race condition enabling symlink following (CWE-363). An attacker     could use this security issue to trick a privileged program into deleting files and directories the     attacker couldn't otherwise access or delete. Rust 1.0.0 through Rust 1.58.0 is affected by this     vulnerability with 1.58.1 containing a patch. Note that the following build targets don't have usable APIs     to properly mitigate the attack, and are thus still vulnerable even with a patched toolchain: macOS before     version 10.10 (Yosemite) and REDOX. We recommend everyone to update to Rust 1.58.1 as soon as possible,     especially people developing programs expected to run in privileged contexts (including system daemons and     setuid binaries), as those have the highest risk of being affected by this. Note that adding checks in     your codebase before calling remove_dir_all will not mitigate the vulnerability, as they would also be     vulnerable to race conditions like remove_dir_all itself. The existing mitigation is working as intended     outside of race conditions. (CVE-2022-21658)

  - Cargo is a package manager for the rust programming language. After a package is downloaded, Cargo     extracts its source code in the ~/.cargo folder on disk, making it available to the Rust projects it     builds. To record when an extraction is successful, Cargo writes ok to the .cargo-ok file at the root of     the extracted source code once it extracted all the files. It was discovered that Cargo allowed packages     to contain a .cargo-ok symbolic link, which Cargo would extract. Then, when Cargo attempted to write ok     into .cargo-ok, it would actually replace the first two bytes of the file the symlink pointed to with ok.
    This would allow an attacker to corrupt one file on the machine using Cargo to extract the package. Note     that by design Cargo allows code execution at build time, due to build scripts and procedural macros. The     vulnerabilities in this advisory allow performing a subset of the possible damage in a harder to track     down way. Your dependencies must still be trusted if you want to be protected from attacks, as it's     possible to perform the same attacks with build scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerability is     present in all versions of Cargo. Rust 1.64, to be released on September 22nd, will include a fix for it.
    Since the vulnerability is just a more limited way to accomplish what a malicious build scripts or     procedural macros can do, we decided not to publish Rust point releases backporting the security fix.
    Patch files are available for Rust 1.63.0 are available in the wg-security-response repository for people     building their own toolchain. Mitigations We recommend users of alternate registries to exercise care in     which package they download, by only including trusted dependencies in their projects. Please note that     even with these vulnerabilities fixed, by design Cargo allows arbitrary code execution at build time     thanks to build scripts and procedural macros: a malicious dependency will be able to cause damage     regardless of these vulnerabilities. crates.io implemented server-side checks to reject these kinds of     packages years ago, and there are no packages on crates.io exploiting these vulnerabilities. crates.io     users still need to exercise care in choosing their dependencies though, as remote code execution is     allowed by design there as well. (CVE-2022-36113)

  - Cargo is a package manager for the rust programming language. It was discovered that Cargo did not limit     the amount of data extracted from compressed archives. An attacker could upload to an alternate registry a     specially crafted package that extracts way more data than its size (also known as a zip bomb),     exhausting the disk space on the machine using Cargo to download the package. Note that by design Cargo     allows code execution at build time, due to build scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerabilities in     this advisory allow performing a subset of the possible damage in a harder to track down way. Your     dependencies must still be trusted if you want to be protected from attacks, as it's possible to perform     the same attacks with build scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerability is present in all versions of     Cargo. Rust 1.64, to be released on September 22nd, will include a fix for it. Since the vulnerability is     just a more limited way to accomplish what a malicious build scripts or procedural macros can do, we     decided not to publish Rust point releases backporting the security fix. Patch files are available for     Rust 1.63.0 are available in the wg-security-response repository for people building their own toolchain.
    We recommend users of alternate registries to excercise care in which package they download, by only     including trusted dependencies in their projects. Please note that even with these vulnerabilities fixed,     by design Cargo allows arbitrary code execution at build time thanks to build scripts and procedural     macros: a malicious dependency will be able to cause damage regardless of these vulnerabilities. crates.io     implemented server-side checks to reject these kinds of packages years ago, and there are no packages on     crates.io exploiting these vulnerabilities. crates.io users still need to excercise care in choosing their     dependencies though, as the same concerns about build scripts and procedural macros apply here.
    (CVE-2022-36114)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The remote SUSE Linux SLED15 / SLED_SAP15 / SLES15 / SLES_SAP15 host has packages installed that are affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the SUSE-SU-2022:3451-1 advisory.

  - Cargo is a package manager for the rust programming language. After a package is downloaded, Cargo     extracts its source code in the ~/.cargo folder on disk, making it available to the Rust projects it     builds. To record when an extraction is successful, Cargo writes ok to the .cargo-ok file at the root of     the extracted source code once it extracted all the files. It was discovered that Cargo allowed packages     to contain a .cargo-ok symbolic link, which Cargo would extract. Then, when Cargo attempted to write ok     into .cargo-ok, it would actually replace the first two bytes of the file the symlink pointed to with ok.
    This would allow an attacker to corrupt one file on the machine using Cargo to extract the package. Note     that by design Cargo allows code execution at build time, due to build scripts and procedural macros. The     vulnerabilities in this advisory allow performing a subset of the possible damage in a harder to track     down way. Your dependencies must still be trusted if you want to be protected from attacks, as it's     possible to perform the same attacks with build scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerability is     present in all versions of Cargo. Rust 1.64, to be released on September 22nd, will include a fix for it.
    Since the vulnerability is just a more limited way to accomplish what a malicious build scripts or     procedural macros can do, we decided not to publish Rust point releases backporting the security fix.
    Patch files are available for Rust 1.63.0 are available in the wg-security-response repository for people     building their own toolchain. Mitigations We recommend users of alternate registries to exercise care in     which package they download, by only including trusted dependencies in their projects. Please note that     even with these vulnerabilities fixed, by design Cargo allows arbitrary code execution at build time     thanks to build scripts and procedural macros: a malicious dependency will be able to cause damage     regardless of these vulnerabilities. crates.io implemented server-side checks to reject these kinds of     packages years ago, and there are no packages on crates.io exploiting these vulnerabilities. crates.io     users still need to exercise care in choosing their dependencies though, as remote code execution is     allowed by design there as well. (CVE-2022-36113)

  - Cargo is a package manager for the rust programming language. It was discovered that Cargo did not limit     the amount of data extracted from compressed archives. An attacker could upload to an alternate registry a     specially crafted package that extracts way more data than its size (also known as a zip bomb),     exhausting the disk space on the machine using Cargo to download the package. Note that by design Cargo     allows code execution at build time, due to build scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerabilities in     this advisory allow performing a subset of the possible damage in a harder to track down way. Your     dependencies must still be trusted if you want to be protected from attacks, as it's possible to perform     the same attacks with build scripts and procedural macros. The vulnerability is present in all versions of     Cargo. Rust 1.64, to be released on September 22nd, will include a fix for it. Since the vulnerability is     just a more limited way to accomplish what a malicious build scripts or procedural macros can do, we     decided not to publish Rust point releases backporting the security fix. Patch files are available for     Rust 1.63.0 are available in the wg-security-response repository for people building their own toolchain.
    We recommend users of alternate registries to excercise care in which package they download, by only     including trusted dependencies in their projects. Please note that even with these vulnerabilities fixed,     by design Cargo allows arbitrary code execution at build time thanks to build scripts and procedural     macros: a malicious dependency will be able to cause damage regardless of these vulnerabilities. crates.io     implemented server-side checks to reject these kinds of packages years ago, and there are no packages on     crates.io exploiting these vulnerabilities. crates.io users still need to excercise care in choosing their     dependencies though, as the same concerns about build scripts and procedural macros apply here.
    (CVE-2022-36114)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

ID	Name	Product	Family	Severity
173151	Amazon Linux 2023 : cargo, clippy, rust (ALAS2023-2023-109)	Nessus	Amazon Linux Local Security Checks	high
171828	Amazon Linux 2 : rust (ALAS-2023-1959)	Nessus	Amazon Linux Local Security Checks	high
166161	GLSA-202210-09 : Rust: Multiple Vulnerabilities	Nessus	Gentoo Local Security Checks	critical
165559	SUSE SLED15 / SLES15 Security Update : rust1.62 (SUSE-SU-2022:3451-1)	Nessus	SuSE Local Security Checks	high

Detections

Analytics

CVE-2022-36114

medium

Tenable Plugins

high

high

critical

high