An attacker may cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data by sending an excessive number of CONTINUATION frames. Maintaining HPACK state requires parsing and processing all HEADERS and CONTINUATION frames on a connection. When a request's headers exceed MaxHeaderBytes, no memory is allocated to store the excess headers, but they are still parsed. This permits an attacker to cause an HTTP/2 endpoint to read arbitrary amounts of header data, all associated with a request which is going to be rejected. These headers can include Huffman-encoded data which is significantly more expensive for the receiver to decode than for an attacker to send. The fix sets a limit on the amount of excess header frames we will process before closing a connection.
https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/421644
https://cloud.google.com/support/bulletins#gcp-2024-022
https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20240419-0009/
https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2024-2687
https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/c/YgW0sx8mN3M