Rust is a programming language. The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the Rust standard library prior to version 1.77.2 did not properly escape arguments when invoking batch files (with the `bat` and `cmd` extensions) on Windows using the `Command`. An attacker able to control the arguments passed to the spawned process could execute arbitrary shell commands by bypassing the escaping. The severity of this vulnerability is critical for those who invoke batch files on Windows with untrusted arguments. No other platform or use is affected. The `Command::arg` and `Command::args` APIs state in their documentation that the arguments will be passed to the spawned process as-is, regardless of the content of the arguments, and will not be evaluated by a shell. This means it should be safe to pass untrusted input as an argument. On Windows, the implementation of this is more complex than other platforms, because the Windows API only provides a single string containing all the arguments to the spawned process, and it's up to the spawned process to split them. Most programs use the standard C run-time argv, which in practice results in a mostly consistent way arguments are splitted. One exception though is `cmd.exe` (used among other things to execute batch files), which has its own argument splitting logic. That forces the standard library to implement custom escaping for arguments passed to batch files. Unfortunately it was reported that our escaping logic was not thorough enough, and it was possible to pass malicious arguments that would result in arbitrary shell execution. Due to the complexity of `cmd.exe`, we didn't identify a solution that would correctly escape arguments in all cases. To maintain our API guarantees, we improved the robustness of the escaping code, and changed the `Command` API to return an `InvalidInput` error when it cannot safely escape an argument. This error will be emitted when spawning the process. The fix is included in Rust 1.77.2. Note that the new escaping logic for batch files errs on the conservative side, and could reject valid arguments. Those who implement the escaping themselves or only handle trusted inputs on Windows can also use the `CommandExt::raw_arg` method to bypass the standard library's escaping logic.

The remote Fedora 40 host has a package installed that is affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the FEDORA-2024-ab4573fb3b advisory.

  - Rust is a programming language. The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the Rust standard library     prior to version 1.77.2 did not properly escape arguments when invoking batch files (with the `bat` and     `cmd` extensions) on Windows using the `Command`. An attacker able to control the arguments passed to the     spawned process could execute arbitrary shell commands by bypassing the escaping. The severity of this     vulnerability is critical for those who invoke batch files on Windows with untrusted arguments. No other     platform or use is affected. The `Command::arg` and `Command::args` APIs state in their documentation that     the arguments will be passed to the spawned process as-is, regardless of the content of the arguments, and     will not be evaluated by a shell. This means it should be safe to pass untrusted input as an argument. On     Windows, the implementation of this is more complex than other platforms, because the Windows API only     provides a single string containing all the arguments to the spawned process, and it's up to the spawned     process to split them. Most programs use the standard C run-time argv, which in practice results in a     mostly consistent way arguments are splitted. One exception though is `cmd.exe` (used among other things     to execute batch files), which has its own argument splitting logic. That forces the standard library to     implement custom escaping for arguments passed to batch files. Unfortunately it was reported that our     escaping logic was not thorough enough, and it was possible to pass malicious arguments that would result     in arbitrary shell execution. Due to the complexity of `cmd.exe`, we didn't identify a solution that would     correctly escape arguments in all cases. To maintain our API guarantees, we improved the robustness of the     escaping code, and changed the `Command` API to return an `InvalidInput` error when it cannot safely     escape an argument. This error will be emitted when spawning the process. The fix is included in Rust     1.77.2. Note that the new escaping logic for batch files errs on the conservative side, and could reject     valid arguments. Those who implement the escaping themselves or only handle trusted inputs on Windows can     also use the `CommandExt::raw_arg` method to bypass the standard library's escaping logic.
    (CVE-2024-24576)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The remote Fedora 38 host has a package installed that is affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the FEDORA-2024-bbb141c1ed advisory.

  - Rust is a programming language. The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the Rust standard library     prior to version 1.77.2 did not properly escape arguments when invoking batch files (with the `bat` and     `cmd` extensions) on Windows using the `Command`. An attacker able to control the arguments passed to the     spawned process could execute arbitrary shell commands by bypassing the escaping. The severity of this     vulnerability is critical for those who invoke batch files on Windows with untrusted arguments. No other     platform or use is affected. The `Command::arg` and `Command::args` APIs state in their documentation that     the arguments will be passed to the spawned process as-is, regardless of the content of the arguments, and     will not be evaluated by a shell. This means it should be safe to pass untrusted input as an argument. On     Windows, the implementation of this is more complex than other platforms, because the Windows API only     provides a single string containing all the arguments to the spawned process, and it's up to the spawned     process to split them. Most programs use the standard C run-time argv, which in practice results in a     mostly consistent way arguments are splitted. One exception though is `cmd.exe` (used among other things     to execute batch files), which has its own argument splitting logic. That forces the standard library to     implement custom escaping for arguments passed to batch files. Unfortunately it was reported that our     escaping logic was not thorough enough, and it was possible to pass malicious arguments that would result     in arbitrary shell execution. Due to the complexity of `cmd.exe`, we didn't identify a solution that would     correctly escape arguments in all cases. To maintain our API guarantees, we improved the robustness of the     escaping code, and changed the `Command` API to return an `InvalidInput` error when it cannot safely     escape an argument. This error will be emitted when spawning the process. The fix is included in Rust     1.77.2. Note that the new escaping logic for batch files errs on the conservative side, and could reject     valid arguments. Those who implement the escaping themselves or only handle trusted inputs on Windows can     also use the `CommandExt::raw_arg` method to bypass the standard library's escaping logic.
    (CVE-2024-24576)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

The remote Fedora 39 host has a package installed that is affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the FEDORA-2024-6bc17db348 advisory.

  - Rust is a programming language. The Rust Security Response WG was notified that the Rust standard library     prior to version 1.77.2 did not properly escape arguments when invoking batch files (with the `bat` and     `cmd` extensions) on Windows using the `Command`. An attacker able to control the arguments passed to the     spawned process could execute arbitrary shell commands by bypassing the escaping. The severity of this     vulnerability is critical for those who invoke batch files on Windows with untrusted arguments. No other     platform or use is affected. The `Command::arg` and `Command::args` APIs state in their documentation that     the arguments will be passed to the spawned process as-is, regardless of the content of the arguments, and     will not be evaluated by a shell. This means it should be safe to pass untrusted input as an argument. On     Windows, the implementation of this is more complex than other platforms, because the Windows API only     provides a single string containing all the arguments to the spawned process, and it's up to the spawned     process to split them. Most programs use the standard C run-time argv, which in practice results in a     mostly consistent way arguments are splitted. One exception though is `cmd.exe` (used among other things     to execute batch files), which has its own argument splitting logic. That forces the standard library to     implement custom escaping for arguments passed to batch files. Unfortunately it was reported that our     escaping logic was not thorough enough, and it was possible to pass malicious arguments that would result     in arbitrary shell execution. Due to the complexity of `cmd.exe`, we didn't identify a solution that would     correctly escape arguments in all cases. To maintain our API guarantees, we improved the robustness of the     escaping code, and changed the `Command` API to return an `InvalidInput` error when it cannot safely     escape an argument. This error will be emitted when spawning the process. The fix is included in Rust     1.77.2. Note that the new escaping logic for batch files errs on the conservative side, and could reject     valid arguments. Those who implement the escaping themselves or only handle trusted inputs on Windows can     also use the `CommandExt::raw_arg` method to bypass the standard library's escaping logic.
    (CVE-2024-24576)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

ID	Name	Product	Family	Severity
194553	Fedora 40 : rust (2024-ab4573fb3b)	Nessus	Fedora Local Security Checks	critical
193552	Fedora 38 : rust (2024-bbb141c1ed)	Nessus	Fedora Local Security Checks	critical
193235	Fedora 39 : rust (2024-6bc17db348)	Nessus	Fedora Local Security Checks	critical

Detections

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CVE-2024-24576

critical

Tenable Plugins

critical

critical

critical