In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: ecdh - explicitly zeroize private_key private_key is overwritten with the key parameter passed in by the caller (if present), or alternatively a newly generated private key. However, it is possible that the caller provides a key (or the newly generated key) which is shorter than the previous key. In that scenario, some key material from the previous key would not be overwritten. The easiest solution is to explicitly zeroize the entire private_key array first. Note that this patch slightly changes the behavior of this function: previously, if the ecc_gen_privkey failed, the old private_key would remain. Now, the private_key is always zeroized. This behavior is consistent with the case where params.key is set and ecc_is_key_valid fails.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd7ef325911eba1b7191b83cb580463242f2090d
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d96187eb8e59b572a8e6a68b6a9837a867ea29df
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80575b252ab0358b7e93895b2a510beb3cb3f975
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/73e5984e540a76a2ee1868b91590c922da8c24c9
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/39173b04abda87872b43c331468a4a14f8f05ce8