CUPS is a standards-based, open-source printing system, and `cups-browsed` contains network printing functionality including, but not limited to, auto-discovering print services and shared printers. `cups-browsed` binds to `INADDR_ANY:631`, causing it to trust any packet from any source, and can cause the `Get-Printer-Attributes` IPP request to an attacker controlled URL. Due to the service binding to `*:631 ( INADDR_ANY )`, multiple bugs in `cups-browsed` can be exploited in sequence to introduce a malicious printer to the system. This chain of exploits ultimately enables an attacker to execute arbitrary commands remotely on the target machine without authentication when a print job is started. This poses a significant security risk over the network. Notably, this vulnerability is particularly concerning as it can be exploited from the public internet, potentially exposing a vast number of systems to remote attacks if their CUPS services are enabled.
https://www.evilsocket.net/2024/09/26/Attacking-UNIX-systems-via-CUPS-Part-I/
https://www.evilsocket.net/2024/09/26/Attacking-UNIX-systems-via-CUPS-Part-I
https://github.com/OpenPrinting/libppd/security/advisories/GHSA-7xfx-47qg-grp6
https://github.com/OpenPrinting/libcupsfilters/security/advisories/GHSA-w63j-6g73-wmg5
https://github.com/OpenPrinting/cups-filters/security/advisories/GHSA-p9rh-jxmq-gq47
https://github.com/OpenPrinting/cups-browsed/security/advisories/GHSA-rj88-6mr5-rcw8
https://github.com/OpenPrinting/cups-browsed/blob/master/daemon/cups-browsed.c#L13992