The remote SUSE Linux SLES15 host has packages installed that are affected by multiple vulnerabilities as referenced in the SUSE-SU-2021:3964-1 advisory.

  - The parser in accepts requests with a space (SP) right after the header name before the colon. This can     lead to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS) in llhttp < v2.1.4 and < v6.0.6. (CVE-2021-22959)

  - The parse function in llhttp < 2.1.4 and < 6.0.6. ignores chunk extensions when parsing the body of     chunked requests. This leads to HTTP Request Smuggling (HRS) under certain conditions. (CVE-2021-22960)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.16, 5.0.8, and 6.1.7 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by     ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat     calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
    This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with     the same name as the directory, where the symlink and directory names in the archive entry used     backslashes as a path separator on posix systems. The cache checking logic used both `\` and `/`     characters as path separators, however `\` is a valid filename character on posix systems. By first     creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink, it was thus possible to bypass     node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into an     arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing arbitrary     file creation and overwrite. Additionally, a similar confusion could arise on case-insensitive     filesystems. If a tar archive contained a directory at `FOO`, followed by a symbolic link named `foo`,     then on case-insensitive file systems, the creation of the symbolic link would remove the directory from     the filesystem, but _not_ from the internal directory cache, as it would not be treated as a cache hit. A     subsequent file entry within the `FOO` directory would then be placed in the target of the symbolic link,     thinking that the directory had already been created. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.16,     5.0.8 and 6.1.7. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these     issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar.
    If this is not possible, a workaround is available in the referenced GHSA-9r2w-394v-53qc. (CVE-2021-37701)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.18, 5.0.10, and 6.1.9 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be modified by a symbolic link is not extracted. This is, in part, achieved by     ensuring that extracted directories are not symlinks. Additionally, in order to prevent unnecessary stat     calls to determine whether a given path is a directory, paths are cached when directories are created.
    This logic was insufficient when extracting tar files that contained both a directory and a symlink with     names containing unicode values that normalized to the same value. Additionally, on Windows systems, long     path portions would resolve to the same file system entities as their 8.3 short path counterparts. A     specially crafted tar archive could thus include a directory with one form of the path, followed by a     symbolic link with a different string that resolves to the same file system entity, followed by a file     using the first form. By first creating a directory, and then replacing that directory with a symlink that     had a different apparent name that resolved to the same entry in the filesystem, it was thus possible to     bypass node-tar symlink checks on directories, essentially allowing an untrusted tar file to symlink into     an arbitrary location and subsequently extracting arbitrary files into that location, thus allowing     arbitrary file creation and overwrite. These issues were addressed in releases 4.4.18, 5.0.10 and 6.1.9.
    The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for these issues. If you are     still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of node-tar. If this is not     possible, a workaround is available in the referenced GHSA-qq89-hq3f-393p. (CVE-2021-37712)

  - The npm package tar (aka node-tar) before versions 4.4.18, 5.0.10, and 6.1.9 has an arbitrary file     creation/overwrite and arbitrary code execution vulnerability. node-tar aims to guarantee that any file     whose location would be outside of the extraction target directory is not extracted. This is, in part,     accomplished by sanitizing absolute paths of entries within the archive, skipping archive entries that     contain `..` path portions, and resolving the sanitized paths against the extraction target directory.
    This logic was insufficient on Windows systems when extracting tar files that contained a path that was     not an absolute path, but specified a drive letter different from the extraction target, such as     `C:some\path`. If the drive letter does not match the extraction target, for example `D:\extraction\dir`,     then the result of `path.resolve(extractionDirectory, entryPath)` would resolve against the current     working directory on the `C:` drive, rather than the extraction target directory. Additionally, a `..`     portion of the path could occur immediately after the drive letter, such as `C:../foo`, and was not     properly sanitized by the logic that checked for `..` within the normalized and split portions of the     path. This only affects users of `node-tar` on Windows systems. These issues were addressed in releases     4.4.18, 5.0.10 and 6.1.9. The v3 branch of node-tar has been deprecated and did not receive patches for     these issues. If you are still using a v3 release we recommend you update to a more recent version of     node-tar. There is no reasonable way to work around this issue without performing the same path     normalization procedures that node-tar now does. Users are encouraged to upgrade to the latest patched     versions of node-tar, rather than attempt to sanitize paths themselves. (CVE-2021-37713)

  - `@npmcli/arborist`, the library that calculates dependency trees and manages the `node_modules` folder     hierarchy for the npm command line interface, aims to guarantee that package dependency contracts will be     met, and the extraction of package contents will always be performed into the expected folder. This is, in     part, accomplished by resolving dependency specifiers defined in `package.json` manifests for dependencies     with a specific name, and nesting folders to resolve conflicting dependencies. When multiple dependencies     differ only in the case of their name, Arborist's internal data structure saw them as separate items that     could coexist within the same level in the `node_modules` hierarchy. However, on case-insensitive file     systems (such as macOS and Windows), this is not the case. Combined with a symlink dependency such as     `file:/some/path`, this allowed an attacker to create a situation in which arbitrary contents could be     written to any location on the filesystem. For example, a package `pwn-a` could define a dependency in     their `package.json` file such as `foo: file:/some/path`. Another package, `pwn-b` could define a     dependency such as `FOO: file:foo.tgz`. On case-insensitive file systems, if `pwn-a` was installed, and     then `pwn-b` was installed afterwards, the contents of `foo.tgz` would be written to `/some/path`, and any     existing contents of `/some/path` would be removed. Anyone using npm v7.20.6 or earlier on a case-     insensitive filesystem is potentially affected. This is patched in @npmcli/arborist 2.8.2 which is     included in npm v7.20.7 and above. (CVE-2021-39134)

  - `@npmcli/arborist`, the library that calculates dependency trees and manages the node_modules folder     hierarchy for the npm command line interface, aims to guarantee that package dependency contracts will be     met, and the extraction of package contents will always be performed into the expected folder. This is     accomplished by extracting package contents into a project's `node_modules` folder. If the `node_modules`     folder of the root project or any of its dependencies is somehow replaced with a symbolic link, it could     allow Arborist to write package dependencies to any arbitrary location on the file system. Note that     symbolic links contained within package artifact contents are filtered out, so another means of creating a     `node_modules` symbolic link would have to be employed. 1. A `preinstall` script could replace     `node_modules` with a symlink. (This is prevented by using `--ignore-scripts`.) 2. An attacker could     supply the target with a git repository, instructing them to run `npm install --ignore-scripts` in the     root. This may be successful, because `npm install --ignore-scripts` is typically not capable of making     changes outside of the project directory, so it may be deemed safe. This is patched in @npmcli/arborist     2.8.2 which is included in npm v7.20.7 and above. For more information including workarounds please see     the referenced GHSA-gmw6-94gg-2rc2. (CVE-2021-39135)

Note that Nessus has not tested for these issues but has instead relied only on the application's self-reported version number.

Detections

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SUSE SLES15 Security Update : nodejs14 (SUSE-SU-2021:3964-1)

high Nessus Plugin ID 155933

Version 1.6