In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix out-of-bounds read when padding the final compound response Compound response handling pads the last response of a compound to an 8-byte boundary by growing the final iov and the RFC1002 length. smb2_allocate_rsp_buf() allocates exactly response_sz. A command can fill the response buffer to within 7 bytes of its end, for example a QUERY_INFO whose output is bounded only by the space left. The padding can then run past the allocation, and ksmbd_tcp_writev() reads those bytes when it sends the response. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_iter+0x744/0x10e0 Call Trace: _copy_from_iter+0x744/0x10e0 tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x2290/0x3f80 ksmbd_tcp_writev+0x10c7/0x1ab0 [ksmbd] Allocate room for the padding when the request is a compound, as smb2_read() and smb2_read_pipe() do for their payloads. response_sz is unchanged, so commands still fill only up to it, and kvzalloc() zeroes the padding.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f4d6f211be04c9b018ce4cfb9793ea1f48c150c3
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/714f27729121d59f103ca4dad7b0c2d1c125cd71
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/52bda0cf91b62bf679d67d6a3adc20b0be8ff4f7
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3092d8a596efaeccdebe0804bf263e5e6eef39d7