In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ata: sata_fsl: Fix use-after-free of host_priv on probe() failure sata_fsl_host_stop() releases hcr_base and host_priv: static void sata_fsl_host_stop(struct ata_host *host) { struct sata_fsl_host_priv *host_priv = host->private_data; iounmap(host_priv->hcr_base); kfree(host_priv); } ->host_stop() is called by the driver core through the ata_host_stop() devres action which ata_host_start() registers, so it is called both when the device is unbound and when probe() fails after the host has been started. The error_exit_with_cleanup label of sata_fsl_probe() releases hcr_base and host_priv as well, and it is reachable from the two device_create_file() calls which are done after the host has been activated. In that case sata_fsl_host_stop() runs on an already freed host_priv, resulting in a use-after-free and a double iounmap()/kfree(). Add a separate error label for the failures happening after the host has been activated, which only detaches the host and leaves hcr_base and host_priv to sata_fsl_host_stop(). Note that ata_host_detach() is dropped from error_exit_with_cleanup, as that label is now only reachable while host is still NULL.
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9d9d62dfef3609f664c60f6fe61528a2e876a64b
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70b1196740d61aabda13b2ad0e9c1dfa2ef9cfa3
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/59eac6863eede5957bfd8872633608431ac42d3c
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3e00737e95485b2a35bf5f515f56a4c416d5971f