Synopsis
The Linux/Unix host has one or more packages installed with a vulnerability that the vendor indicates will not be patched.
Description
The Linux/Unix host has one or more packages installed that are impacted by a vulnerability without a vendor supplied patch available.
- In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: process: Fix kernel gp leakage childregs represents the registers which are active for the new thread in user context. For a kernel thread, childregs->gp is never used since the kernel gp is not touched by switch_to. For a user mode helper, the gp value can be observed in user space after execve or possibly by other means. [From the email thread] The /* Kernel thread */ comment is somewhat inaccurate in that it is also used for user_mode_helper threads, which exec a user process, e.g. /sbin/init or when /proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern is a pipe. Such threads do not have PF_KTHREAD set and are valid targets for ptrace etc. even before they exec. childregs is the *user* context during syscall execution and it is observable from userspace in at least five ways: 1. kernel_execve does not currently clear integer registers, so the starting register state for PID 1 and other user processes started by the kernel has sp = user stack, gp = kernel
__global_pointer$, all other integer registers zeroed by the memset in the patch comment. This is a bug in its own right, but I'm unwilling to bet that it is the only way to exploit the issue addressed by this patch. 2. ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET): you can PTRACE_ATTACH to a user_mode_helper thread before it execs, but ptrace requires SIGSTOP to be delivered which can only happen at user/kernel boundaries. 3.
/proc/*/task/*/syscall: this is perfectly happy to read pt_regs for user_mode_helpers before the exec completes, but gp is not one of the registers it returns. 4. PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER: LOCKDOWN_PERF normally prevents access to kernel addresses via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_INTR, but due to this bug kernel addresses are also exposed via PERF_SAMPLE_REGS_USER which is permitted under LOCKDOWN_PERF. I have not attempted to write exploit code. 5. Much of the tracing infrastructure allows access to user registers. I have not attempted to determine which forms of tracing allow access to user registers without already allowing access to kernel registers. (CVE-2024-35871)
Note that Nessus relies on the presence of the package as reported by the vendor.
Solution
There is no known solution at this time.
Plugin Details
File Name: unpatched_CVE_2024_35871.nasl
Agent: unix
Supported Sensors: Nessus Agent, Nessus
Risk Information
Vector: CVSS2#AV:L/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C
Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Temporal Vector: CVSS:3.0/E:U/RL:O/RC:C
Vulnerability Information
Required KB Items: Host/cpu, Host/local_checks_enabled, global_settings/vendor_unpatched
Exploit Ease: No known exploits are available
Vulnerability Publication Date: 5/10/2024